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Abstract
We present abstract complexity results about Coquand and Hyland-Ong game semantics, that
will lead to new bounds on the length of first-order cut-elimination, normalization, interaction
between expansion trees and any other dialogical process game semantics can model and apply
to. In particular, we provide a novel method to bound the length of interactions between visible
strategies and to measure precisely the tower of exponentials defining the worst-case complexity.
Our study improves the old estimates on average by several exponentials.
1 Introduction
Of all towers of the world, the one we would contemplate far more admiringly if it were lower
rather than higher, is a tower in logic. It is the stack of exponentials defining the worst-case
complexity of cut-elimination, normalization and dialogues between strategies interpreting
first-order proofs [8, 31]:
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The tower’s height is measured by the rank r of the proof, which is in sequent calculus the
highest among the logical complexities of the proof cut-formulas and in natural deduction
the highest among the type complexities of the proof redexes; k is just the proof height.
Given the use of complex cuts and redexes in logical derivations, it does not take too much
to reach astronomical worst-case bounds.
Yet, thanks to the famous Curry-Howard correspondence [27], we know that logical
proofs, both in natural deduction [7, 24, 30] and in sequent calculus [21, 16], can be seen
as programs of some typed functional programming language. And in the New York of a
programming language, many inhabitants are indeed to be found on the highest floors of the
highest skyscrapers, but the vast majority of them live in far lower buildings. That’s pro-
gramming: one can write enormously complex programs, but also very simple and efficient
ones. Having complexity bounds only for the very worst case of the very worst program is
of no use when one looks for a more precise idea of how much time it takes a particular
program to terminate its execution. Unless one is terribly unlucky, his actual programs will
take much less time than the worst possible program to complete their computations. How
much less? We need to measure precisely the tower of exponentials, because it is its height
that is to blame for the unrealistic bounds it computes.
The reason why the worst-case analysis of cut-elimination fares so roughly on average is
the complexity measure adopted: the rank of the proof is a superficial information, in a literal
∗ This work was funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF Lise Meitner grant M 1930–N35 and previ-
ously supported by the FWF grant P25160–N25.
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sense. Indeed, one looks only at the surface of a cut, the cut-formula, without caring about
how the formula is used in the proof. It is like trying to determine the maximum speed of a
car just by studying its outward appearance, while ignoring completely its internal engine!
But what is the engine of a cut? What is the real responsible of the worst-case complexity
bounds, the mechanism that determines the height of the tower of exponentials?
1.1 Coquand and Hyland-Ong Game Semantics
It turns out that the laws governing the complexity of cut-elimination are written in a
game semantical language. If we want to answer our questions, we have no choice: we must
translate them in terms of games and strategies. In the quest for a better complexity measure
of cut-elimination and normalization, the single most important tool is then game semantics.
Game semantics was in the background of logic at least since Herbrand’s Theorem: this is
clear by Miller’s formulation of it using expansion trees [28], that is, game strategies, as
remarked by Heijltjes [20]. But the idea of interpreting formulas as games and proofs
as winning strategies, appeared time and again in the history of logic: in Gentzen’s and
Novikoff’s proofs of consistency of Arithmetic (see [15]), in Gödel’s and Kreisel’s functional
interpretations (see [25, 6, 29]), in Lorenzen’s game semantics (see [18]).
The old, statical game semantics was brought to a new life with the invention of the
modern, dynamical game semantics, initiated by Coquand’s [14, 15] discovery that cut-
elimination in Arithmetic mirrors a debate between two strategies. As opposed to ordinary
games, players may every now and then revise their moves and backtrack to a previous posi-
tion. Coquand proved by elegant combinatorial means that the dialogues between strategies
interpreting proofs always terminate, thus proving as well the termination of cut-elimination,
as later shown by Herbelin [21]. The advantage of game semantics is that it ignores inessen-
tial aspects of proofs and turns the spotlight to their geometrical structure.
Hyland and Ong [22] took Coquand-style game semantics to a new level. The key move is
realizing that one can drop altogether winning conditions: debates need not always terminate
with the win or the loss of one of the two players. Game semantics can in such a way model
pure dialogues, exchanges of answers and questions, as those occurring during the evaluation
of a functional program. The linear head reduction strategy of typed lambda terms can thus
be modeled as a debate between strategies [17]. Thanks to these and several other insights,
Hyland and Ong discovered how to construct fully abstract models for typed functional
languages (see also [1, 2]).
As plays correspond to cut-elimination [21] and normalization [17], one encounters in
game semantics the same complexity estimates. The rank of a cut-formula becomes the depth
of the game arena, and the very same tower of exponentials that bounds cut-elimination,
bounds also the dialogues between strategies corresponding to first-order proofs. The result
was proved by Clairambault [12, 13]; it constitutes an important demonstration that game
semantics may serve as a viable complexity analysis tool. Nevertheless, the depth of game
arenas is not a precise complexity measure for the same reasons we discussed above: it
corresponds just to the rank of cut-formulas.
It may appear that game semantics is leading us nowhere. For the moment we hardly
achieved anything but to translate doubts and questions from one language to another.
What is the engine of a strategy? How to measure its complexity? We are missing a piece
of the puzzle and to get it, we need to make two long jumps: one backward and the other
forward.
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1.2 Back to Coquand’s Simple Backtracking
Debates in game semantics can be extremely involved; proving their termination, like es-
caping from an intricate labyrinth with no Ariadne’s thread at hand. Coquand eventually
overcame these difficulties by inventing a notation with deep geometrical properties: pointer
sequences. But in a preliminary effort [14] to establish his successive termination result
[15], he settled for a weaker one: that debates between simple backtracking strategies, now
called 1-backtracking strategies, always terminate. According to Coquand, a 1-backtracking
strategy “never changes its mind about a value it has previously considered wrong”. This
kind of strategies are by design less involved than general ones and their debates are more
predictable; that allowed Coquand to get away at least with some result from his first
struggle.
1.3 Berardi-de’Liguoro Backtracking Level of a Strategy
The idea of classifying strategies according to some complexity measure had an extraordinary
potential, yet it was completely abandoned. Only much later, did Berardi and de’Liguoro
[9] generalize the concept of 1-backtracking to the more general n-backtracking for any n ∈ N.
It was a major conceptual advancement. Their definition is inspired by Gold’s learning
theory [19, 23] and by the Berardi-Coquand-Hayashi [11] notion of n-backtracking game
– an alternative to Coquand and Hyland-Ong games up to now only partially explored.
However, it was not at all obvious how to formulate a notion of n-backtracking strategy in
Coquand and Hyland-Ong games as well, which is what they did.
The definition is logically complex and has a geometrical and temporal flavour, but its
meaning is simple to grasp. For example, a strategy is 2-backtracking if it is allowed to
change its mind about previous mind changes of level 1. That reminds us of some juridical
systems: only a judge of second level can change the decision of a judge of level one. Thus a
judge of an appeal court can very well revise an ordinary judge’s decision, but two ordinary
judges cannot question each other’s sentences. With Coquand-Hyland-Ong pointer notation,
a mind change of level 1 is represented by a move pointing backward:
●1 . . . ○1
A mind change of level 2 can be depicted as a crossing:
●1 . . . ●2 . . . ○1 . . . ○2
Though they are not physically removed, we consider the moves between the ending points
of a pointer to be ideally erased by the mind change. Thus, the move ○1 is a first mind
change erasing the moves before itself and after ●1; the move ○2 is a mind change about the
first mind change and recovers one of the formerly retracted moves, ●2. There is a proviso:
for the move ○2 to be considered a real mind change of level 2, at the moment ○2 is played the
pointer from ○1 must be active: a pointer is active if it is crossed only by inactive pointers;
a pointer is inactive if there is an active pointer crossing it. By considering mind changes
about mind changes about mind changes... one arrives at the concept of n-backtracking. A
n-backtracking strategy has backtracking level b = n. We shall have to describe precisely
the notion and familiarize extensively with it in the following. For the moment it is enough
to say that the backtracking level is a measure of how much involved and intricate the
geometrical structure of a strategy is. The backtracking level is also easy to compute: if a
strategy interprets a first-order proof or a simply typed lambda term, one can determine its
backtracking level in plain quadratic time, and we conjecture linear.
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1.4 Backtracking Level as Complexity Measure
We have found the complexity measure we were looking for: it is the backtracking level of
a strategy. We shall prove that the height of the tower of exponentials bounding the length
of interactions between strategies is determined by the backtracking level of the strategies.
The explanation of this complexity result is our paper’s
Fundamental Thesis: the real engine of a strategy is its backtracking mechanism; the
power of this engine is measured by the strategy’s backtracking level; the higher the back-
tracking level, the more involved the geometrical structure of the backtracking mechanism is
and the longer it will take to conclude a debate with the strategy.
As a consequence of our thesis, at first we conjectured a weaker result than the one presented
here, which was: if we consider two strategies with backtracking level respectively n and
m, b = max(m,n), and the size of the two strategies is bounded by k, then the complexity
bound for the length of any interaction between them is
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This estimate already outperforms the old ones, because the backtracking level of a strategy
is completely independent of the arena depth. A 2-backtracking strategy can live in an arena
of depth 1000; then one has a new bound given by a tower of exponentials of height 3 versus
an old one of height 1001. Moreover, as we shall see, the backtracking level of a strategy is
bound by the depth of the arena, modulo a trivial transformation. That explains perfectly
why the rank of a proof worked as a worst-case complexity measure; in a sense, one looked
at the right place, without knowing the good reason.
Our fundamental thesis seemed to suggest that our first conjecture was already optimal.
For example, one would expect that when a 5-backtracking strategy interacts with a 1-
backtracking one, the debate should take in general no less time than prescribed by a tower
of exponential of height 6.
We were struck when we found that the case it’s not. The complexity bound in this situation
is much tighter: a tower of height 2, that is just an exponential
2(k logk)2
And 1-backtracking strategies are no fortunate exceptions. If a 5-backtracking strategy
interacts with a 2-backtracking one, the complexity bound is just a tower of height 3, a
double exponential:
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More in general, given two strategies of backtracking level respectively n and m and of size
less than k, we shall prove that the length of their interaction is determined by the minimum
among their backtracking levels, that is by b =min(m,n), and will be less than
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We can interpret this result as a safety of interactions result. No matter how unpredictable
and complex the context in which a strategy is thrown in, the strategy will always have safe
interactions, from the complexity point of view, whose rate of growth is determined by the
strategy’s own backtracking level.
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1.5 n-Backtracking, n-Quantifiers Excluded-middle EM
n
and Learning
One may acknowledge that indeed the concept of n-backtracking provides the means for
a very refined analysis of the length of dialogues in logic, but still have the suspicions
that the analysis is of no practical consequence. Are there around enough 1-backtracking
strategies, 2-backtracking strategies and so on, or are they odd entities appearing, like
the 29th of February, once in every four years of logical and mathematical practice? Are
almost all formulas of complexity n going to have only n-backtracking winning strategies?
The answer is no. In Arithmetic the landscape is already partially studied, thanks to the
correspondence between the excluded middle EMn over formulas with n quantifiers and
the concept of learning. In [4] it was shown, by means of Interactive realizability [5], that
every arithmetical proof using only EM1 as classical principle represents a winning recursive
strategy for the related 1-backtracking game in the sense of [11]. In [11] was proved – in a
less refined way – that any arithmetical formula derivable using EMn as a classical principle,
has a winning recursive strategy in n-backtracking games. As these results are very likely
to hold also for first-order logic in the formulation of [7], it is clear that strategies of low
backtracking level are the norm rather than the exception. Moreover, as a matter of fact
many theorems in Arithmetic are proved just by using EM1 and many theorems in Analysis
with EM2.
The results of this work also definitely confirm a point that has been made several times
[5, 3, 10]: proofs limited to EM1 or EM2 yield relatively efficient strategies, and in general
the learning theory is the correct one to understand and improve the complexity of programs
extracted from classical proofs. The surprise, here, is the connection with the complexity of
intuitionistic proofs as well.
1.6 Content of the Paper
In this paper we establish the discussed bounds on the interaction lengths between visible
bounded strategies in Coquand and Hyland-Ong game semantics. They will certainly lead to
new bounds also for cut-elimination, normalization and dialogues between expansion trees in
first-order logic; but given the great generality of game semantics, our results are interesting
in their own right. For space reasons, we will not study in detail concrete applications and
we delay the matter to forthcoming papers. As explained in [12, 13, 17], however, bounds
in game semantics automatically translate into bounds for linear head reduction in typed
lambda calculus. There is also Herbelin’s result [21], showing a step-by-step correspondence
between plays in game semantics and the weak head reduction cut-elimination strategy in an
infinitary sequent calculus for Arithmetic. The situation in first-order logic is a bit subtler,
because atomic formulas are undecidable, thus winning conditions must be different; yet we
do not see major obstacles to adapting Herbelin’s methods also to that setting.
We devote the introductory part of the paper to recalling the game semantical ideas of
Coquand, Hyland-Ong and Berardi-de’Liguoro, with new examples and viewpoints that we
feel are essential to understand the technical part of the paper. In particular, in Section §2,
we describe the main concepts of Coquand and Hyland-Ong game semantics and study an
example based on Miller’s expansion trees. In Section §3, we explain in detail the Berardi-
de’Liguoro notion of backtracking level of a strategy. In Section §4, we outline our proof
plan, which is carried out in detail in Sections §5, §6, §7, §8.
2 Coquand-Hyland-Ong Game Semantics
As Wadler [27] put it, “Curry-Howard is a double-barrelled name which ensures the existence
of other double-barrelled names”. Since logical proofs are isomorphic to computer programs,
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many concepts happen to be discovered twice: once in logic, once in computer science.
Girard-Reynolds system F is an example, Coquand-Hyland-Ong game semantics is another.
Actually, most literature on game semantics fails to mention that Coquand and Hyland-Ong
game semantics are by no means different concepts but just one semantics that turns out to
have several applications: cut-elimination in the case of Coquand, denotational semantics
for typed lambda calculus in the case of Hyland-Ong. Since the latter has in turn as many
variants as functional languages out there, to avoid the one, none, one hundred thousand
Pirandellian fragmentation, we adopt the most abstract Hyland-Ong terminology (see [13]),
calling it Coquand-Hyland-Ong game semantics.
Arenas are the structures where games take place. As in many real-life two-player games,
there are a set of moves M and a binary relation of justification ⊢ between moves. The
elements of M may represent elementary actions of a player, like moving a single piece in
chess or choosing a witness in logical dialogues; but they may also encode complex positions,
like the entire chessboard or a full logical formula. Often a game can be formalized in both
ways. The relation ⊢ tells whether a move is a direct answer to another one or whether
from a configuration of the game a player can pass to another. Every move is labeled by a
function λ as either Player or Opponent move, and there are special initial moves that start
the game.
∎ Definition 1 (Arenas). An arena A is a structure (M,⊢, λ, I) such that:
M,⊢ is a graph: M is a set of nodes, called moves, and ⊢ is a binary relation over M ,
called enabling. If m ⊢ n, then m is said to justify n and n is said to answer m.
λ ∶ M → {P,O} is a function indicating whether any move m is a Player move or an
Opponent move and is such that for every m,n ∈M , m ⊢ n Ô⇒ λ(m) ≠ λ(n), which is
called the alternation condition.
I is a subset of M called the set of initial moves and is such that for every m ∈ I,
λ(m) = O. We assume ∗ ∈ I.
A simple play over A is any sequence of moves m1 m2 m3 . . .mi such that m1 ∈ I and
m1 ⊢m2 ⊢m3 ⊢ ⋯ ⊢mi
and represents a backtracking free play.
A is said to be of finite depth whenever there exists a k ∈ N such that no simple play
over A is of length greater than k; in this case, k is said to be the depth of A.
When we shall want to talk about a player without specifying who he is, we will call him
player p, q, . . . and the other player will be p, q, . . .; that is, if p = P , then p = O and if
p = O, then p = P . Often moves will be denoted with white ○ or black ● circles, that may
be indexed; in a play, Player and Opponent moves will always be represented with different
colors. Concatenations of sequences s and s′ of moves will just be denoted as s s′. An initial
segment of a sequence s0 s1 . . . sk is any prefix s0 s1 . . . si, with 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
So far, we have described just a standard game: we have considered only simple plays,
where players move in an alternating fashion and each player immediately answers the last
move of the opponent. A simple play in chess would be: ∗1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nf6 3.Nxe5, which
means moving in order a white pawn to e4, a black pawn to e5, a white knight on f3, a black
knight on f6 and taking the pawn on e5 with the white knight. Graphically, with arrows
representing the justification relation ⊢, one has:
∗ e4 e5 Nf3 Nf6 Nxe5
Game Semantics and the Geometry of Backtracking 7
When interpreting dialogues in logic and computer science, however, it is necessary to allow
players to delay answers, take back moves, backtrack to a previous opponent move and
answer differently. All of that can be represented by an act of answering a previous move
with a pointer. For example, black, instead of answering the move 3.Nxe5, may change his
mind and answer differently the move 2.Nf3 by placing his knight to c6:
∗ e4 e5 Nf3 Nf6 Nxe5 Nc6
Globally, there are now two plays on the board: ∗1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nf6 3.Nxe5 and ∗1.e4 e5
2.Nf3 Nc6. The play might go on like this
∗ e4 e5 Nf3 Nf6 Nxe5 Nc6 e5 d6
The plays on the board are now: ∗1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nf6 3.Nxe5 d6 and ∗1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nc6 3.e5.
We can see in the example above the two different characters that backtracking moves may
possess: the move d6 is a delayed first answer to Nxe5 and represents a mind change about
which game line to play; the move Nc6 is a second answer to Nf3 and represents a mind
change about how to answer a move that was already answered. As for our purposes it
would be useless to take account of that difference, we shall regard each backtracking move
as a mind change, without further distinctions.
Now we turn to a crucial concept, that of view: a backtracking strategy needs to know what
part of the game history to consider when deciding a new move. In any game, what really
matters from the perspective of a player is: starting with a move, waiting for an answer,
making a move, waiting for an answer, making a move, waiting for an answer and so on...
The kind of strategy that arises from the interpretation of proofs and programs, just needs
this sequence of move-answer, move-answer, move-answer... in order to decide the next move.
The view of white in the last game above is thus: ∗ e4 e5 Nf3 Nf6 Nxe5 d6. In general, to
determine the current view, a player looks at the last move of the opponent, then follows
the pointer to the move that was answered, then consider the immediately preceding move,
then follows the pointer to another move and so on... until an initial move is reached. In
the picture
● ○z . . . ●z . . . ○3 . . . ●3 ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1
the displayed moves, where ● may or may not appear, represent the view of the player with
the obligation to play after the last move ●1.
∎ Definition 2 (Plays, Views). Let A = (M,⊢, λ, I) be an arena.
A finite sequence s = s0 s1 . . . sn of moves of M is said to be a justified sequence over
A if s0 is initial and every move si of s, with i > 0, is equipped with a pointer to a
previous move sj justifying it: that is, j < i and sj ⊢ si.
A justified sequence s = s0 s1 . . . sn is said to be a play over A if satisfies the alternation
condition: for every 0 ≤ i < n, λ(si) ≠ λ(si+1).
The pairs of moves e = (●,○) such that ● ⊢ ○ are called edges; e is said to be the edge
from ○ and is denoted as ↖ ○; if λ(○) = P , e is a P-edge, if λ(○) = O, e is an O-edge.
The Player-view ⌜s⌝ of a justified sequence s is defined recursively as follow:
⌜s ○⌝ = ⌜s⌝ ○ , if λ(○) = P .
⌜s ○ s′ ●⌝ = ⌜s⌝ ○ ● , if λ(●) = O and ● points to ○.
⌜●⌝ = ●, if ● ∈ I .
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Therefore, whenever s = ●0 ○1 s1 ●1 ○2 s2 ●2 . . . ○k sk ●k and ●0 is an initial move and for
each i ≥ 1, ●i is an Opponent move pointing to ○i, then ⌜s⌝ = ●0 ○1 ●1 ○2 ●2 . . . ○k ●k.
The Opponent-view ⌞s⌟ of a justified sequence s is defined recursively as follow:
⌞s ○⌟ = ⌞s⌟ ○ , if λ(○) = O.
⌞s ○ s′ ●⌟ = ⌞s⌟ ○ ● , if λ(●) = P and ● points to ○.
⌞s⌟ = ǫ, if s is the empty sequence ǫ.
Therefore, whenever s = ●0 s0 ○0 ●1 s1 ○1 . . .●k sk ○k and ●0 is an initial move and for each
i ≥ 0, ○i is a Player move pointing to ●i, then ⌞s⌟ = ●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●k ○k.
Every play s over an arena A comes with a set of edges, representing the justification
pointers. We say that an edge e is in s whenever e is among the edges of s. As standard in
the literature, we will not bother with how, formally, justification pointers are represented;
it could be, for example, with a function f ∶ N → N such that f(x) < x for every x > 0.
However, we will just consider plays as sequences of moves with arrows pointing back to a
previous move, as in the examples that we consider throughout the paper. In general, when
taking subsequences of a play, we will maintain the arrows of the original play. We remark
that, according to our definition, in any justified sequence every move different from the
first points back to a previous move, like in [15, 22]; in particular, initial moves that occur
in the middle of the play must obey the rule. There is no real technical need to enforce
this restriction, but it is useful, for it allows to treat uniformly backtracking moves as those
pointing before the immediately preceding move. Otherwise, an initial move in the middle
of a play that does not point to anything should still be considered a backtracking to the
start of the play, but this would not be recorded by an explicit pointer. In some literature,
that behaviour is permitted; but one can always put in front of any play a pair of dummy
moves, “Let’s begin” and “I’m ready”, the second of which justifies all Opponent moves, so
every formerly initial move can point back to it.
The definition of strategy is standard: it is a set of plays, those considered to “follow”
the strategy; alternatively, a strategy for a player can be interpreted as a function, mapping
any play s ending with an adversary move to some suggested answers. A bounded strategy
is the kind of strategy that is supposed to interpret a simply typed lambda term or a first-
order proof: there is a bound on the length that the view of any play in the strategy can
have. The idea is that these strategies always stop playing after a number of moves below
a bound which is known in advance. In this paper we shall only be concerned with visible
strategies: those only needing a view as the history to refer back to with their answers.
Visible sequences represent interactions between visible strategies.
∎ Definition 3 (Visibility, Strategies, Interactions). Let A = (M,⊢, λ, I) be an arena.
Let s = s0 s1 . . . sn be a play over A. s is said to be visible if for all 0 < i ≤ n, si points to
a move in ⌜s0 s1 . . . si−1⌝ when λ(si) = P and si points to a move in ⌞s0 s1 . . . si−1⌟ when
λ(si) = O.
A Player strategy over A is any set σ of even-length plays over A such that if smn ∈ σ,
then s ∈ σ. σ is said to be visible if for every sm ∈ σ, m points to a move in ⌜s⌝.
An Opponent strategy over A is any set σ of odd-length plays over A such that if
smn ∈ σ, then s ∈ σ. σ is said to be visible if for every sm ∈ σ, with s non empty, m
points to a move in ⌞s⌟.
A visible Player strategy σ is said to be bounded by k if k ∈ N and for no s ∈ σ, ⌜s⌝ is
of length greater than k. A visible Opponent strategy σ is said to be bounded by k if
k ∈ N and for no s ∈ σ, ⌞s⌟ is of length greater than k.
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Let σ and τ be respectively a strategy for Player and a strategy for Opponent over A.
The set of interactions σ ⋆ τ is defined as
σ ⋆ τ ∶= {sm ∣ (λ(m) = P Ô⇒ sm ∈ σ ∧ s ∈ τ) ∧ (λ(m) = O Ô⇒ sm ∈ τ ∧ s ∈ σ)}
It represents a match between σ and τ , i.e. a play which follows both the strategies.
The goal of this paper is to study the length of the interactions in σ ⋆ τ , whenever σ and
τ are bounded: by Coquand’s termination Theorem [15], in that case, σ ⋆ τ contains only
finite sequences. But first an example.
2.1 Example: Space, Time and Expansion Trees
Game semantics does more than just describe debates between strategies; it also sheds light
on the roles that the very concepts of space and time play in proof representation. But what
are space and time in logic?
Conventional wisdom suggests that proofs, on one hand, have a geometrical structure
which is important to investigate: after all, a proof is a tree in a two dimensional space. On
the other hand, conventional wisdom suggests that the temporal process of constructing a
proof is as important as its geometrical appearance: proofs pertain also to time. Time is no
issue: the act itself of drawing an inference takes place in time and to each logical step is
possible to associate the moment in which it was made. But where exactly is the geometry
of a proof to be sought? Here conventional wisdom is wrong.
Think about a cut-free proof of a prenex formula in a one-sided sequent calculus. The
geometrical structure of the proof tree is trivial: it is a linear sequence of ∃ and ∀ inferences
introducing respectively first-order terms and eigenvariables; after those introductions, a
propositional tautology is proved, but at that very point the proof becomes no longer inter-
esting! The geometrical structure of a proof does not coincide with its tree structure: it is
concealed in expansion trees.
Miller’s expansion trees [28] allow to formulate Herbrand’s Theorem for what it is: a
game semantical interpretation of proofs. For each cut-free Tait-style sequent calculus proof
of a sequent Γ,A, one can trace how the formula A is used in the proof, keeping note of what
first-order terms t the existential quantifiers of A are instantiated to and what eigenvariables
a the universal quantifiers of A introduce. The result is an expansion tree. For example, the
formula ∃x∀y ∃z P (x, y, z) may have the following expansion tree:
∃x∀y ∃z P (x, y, z)
∀y ∃z P (t3, y, z)
∃z P (t3, a3, z)
a3
t3
∀y ∃z P (t2, y, z)
∃z P (t2, a2, z)
a2
t2
∀y ∃z P (t1, y, z)
∃z P (t1, a1, z)
P (t1, a1, t4)
t4
a1
t1
The representation of a proof as a two dimensional object, like an expansion tree, makes
prominent space at the expense of time; the representation of a proof as a linear sequence,
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like in Hilbert’s systems, gives priority to time at the cost of space. How to represent at
once space and time?
We first transform a cut-formula of a proof under focus into an expansion tree; this
operation extracts the geometrical information hidden in the proof. We then rearrange the
expansion tree in linear form, according to the order in which its nodes were introduced
in the proof, obtaining a pointer sequence: this operation unfolds the temporal informa-
tion coded in the proof. Pointer sequences then solve the problem of packing space and
time information into a single object: the geometrical information is preserved by means
of backwards pointers, while the temporal information is represented by the linear ordering
of nodes! And finally something appears right before our eyes, something very clear, yet
something we were completely blind to: the edges of the tree crossing each other. That is
all we need to measure a proof’s complexity. Let us study an example.
The arena for the Coquand-style backtracking game which corresponds to the formula
∃x∀y ∃z P (x, y, z) comprises as set of moves and justification relation:
M = {∗}∪{x ∶= t ∣ t is a closed term}∪{y ∶= t ∣ t is a closed term}∪{z ∶= t ∣ t is a closed term}
⊢ = {(∗, x ∶= t) ∣ t closed}∪{(x ∶= t1, y ∶= t2) ∣ t1, t2 closed}∪{(y ∶= t1, z ∶= t2) ∣ t1, t2 closed}
As remarked by Heijltjes [20], the expansion tree above may be seen as a strategy: the term
labels t1, t2, t3, t4 are the witnesses to be played by Player for the corresponding formula
of the tree, while the eigenvariable labels a1, a2, a3 are to be replaced by the answers of
Opponent. In order for the tree to be a correct specification of a strategy, Player must know
in which order to play the moves, because the terms ti might contain eigenvariables aj . The
tree above is correct if there is a total ordering of its edge labels ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓn such that:
1. if i < j and ℓi and ℓj are on the same branch, then ℓi comes before ℓj in that branch.
2. for every i, j, if ℓi is an eigenvariable and ℓj a term containing it, i < j.
An expansion tree extracted from a cut-free proof is correct by construction [20]. A correct
ordering of the edge labels of the tree above could be: t1 a1 t2 a2 t3 a3 t4, which would give the
following strategy for Player: play first t1 for the root formula, then wait for the answer a1,
then backtrack and play t2 (which can contain at most a1 as variable) for the root formula,
then wait for the answer a2, then backtrack and play t3 (which can contain at most a1, a2
as variables) for the root formula, then wait for the answer a3 and finally play t4 (which can
contain at most a1, a2, a3 as variables). Formally, the strategy σ for Player is the set of even
plays s such that ⌜s⌝ is an initial segment of a play of the following shape:
∗ x ∶= t1 y ∶= u1 x ∶= t
′
2 y ∶= u2 x ∶= t
′
3 y ∶= u3 z ∶= t
′
4
where t′2 = t2[u1/a1], t
′
3 = t3[u1/a1 u2/a2], t
′
4 = t4[u1/a1 u2/a2 u3/a3] and u1, u2, u3 are terms
representing the values for a1, a2, a3 selected by Opponent. The definition of σ might seem
mysterious at first, but essentially there are no other choices: to determine his next move
in a play s, Player must compute ⌜s⌝, which is the part of the history that concerns him,
and then look at the corresponding initial segment of the linearized expansion tree. It is
immediate to verify that σ is visible and bounded by 8.
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A strategy for Opponent, likewise, is given by any expansion tree for the involutive
negation of the Player formula, for example:
∀x∃y ∀z ¬P (x, y, z)
∃y ∀z ¬P (b, y, z)
∀z ¬P (b, u3, z)
¬P (b, u3, b3)
b3
u3
∀z ¬P (b, u2, z)
¬P (b, u2, b2)
b2
u2
∀z ¬P (b, u1, z)
¬P (b, u1, b1)
b1
u1
b
A correct ordering of the edge labels of the tree above could be: bu1 b1 u2 b2 u3 b3 and the
corresponding strategy τ for Opponent is the set of odd plays s such that ⌞s⌟ is an initial
segment of a play of the following shape:
∗ x ∶= v y ∶= u′1 z ∶= v1 y ∶= u
′
2 z ∶= v2 y ∶= u
′
3
where u′1 = u1[v/b], u
′
2 = u2[v/b v1/b1], u
′
3 = u3[v/b v1/b1 v2/b2] and v, v1, v2 are terms
representing the values for b1, b2, b3 selected by Player. It is immediate to verify that τ is
visible and bounded by 7.
The strategies σ and τ are both eager to backtrack, but each one assumes that the
other does not. Innocence [22] is the key tool to reconcile in a consistent manner these
opposite desires: each strategy concentrates only on the current view to determine its answer,
discarding the many backtracking moves that the other strategy may perform. Computing
the interactions in σ ⋆ τ is thus very instructive for familiarizing with the concept of view
and for seeing the already big combinatorial explosion that is generated. We leave to the
readers the details of the computations. For simplicity of notation, we assume now that
the terms t1, t2, t3, t4, u1, u2, u3 do not contain variables, so that the substitutions have no
effect. This simplification has no influence on the length of the interaction, which is totally
independent of the shape of terms. An initial segment of the interaction between the two
strategies then looks like this:
∗ x ∶= t1 y ∶= u1 x ∶= t2 y ∶= u1 x ∶= t3 y ∶= u1 z ∶= t4 y ∶= u2 x ∶= t2 y ∶= u1 x ∶= t3 y ∶= u1 z ∶= t4 y ∶= u3
and the interaction finishes with x ∶= t2 y ∶= u1 x ∶= t3 y ∶= u1 z ∶= t4.
In general, a cut between two cut-free proofs of respectively Γ,A and Γ,A generates a
number of interactions between two expansion trees, one for A and one for the involutive
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negation A; the length of the cut-elimination process is then a simple function of the
maximal length of these interactions. In this paper we do not investigate the exact connection
between cut-elimination and strategy interaction, the situation in first-order logic being
slightly different from the situation in Arithmetic [21].
2.2 A Simple Property of Views
The reader should make sure to be proficient with the concepts of view and visibility: several
proofs will require computations on views and checking visibility of plays. To “warm up”, a
simple property of views that we shall use very often is the following.
∎ Proposition 4 (Shape of Views). Suppose s = r ● r′ ○ is a visible play over an arena A and
there is an edge (●,○) in s. Then s is of the form:
r ● ○k . . . ●k○k−1 . . . ●k−1. . . ○2 . . . ●2○1 . . . ●1 ○
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, ●i+1 immediately precedes ○i and there is an edge (○i,●i) in s.
Proof. Let λ(○) = p. We can write s as
s = a ○z . . . ●z . . . . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1 ○
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ z, ●i+1 immediately precedes ○i and there is an edge (○i,●i) in s and a ∈ I
or a is the empty sequence. Therefore the p-view of r ● r′ is
w = a ○z ●z . . . ○2 ●2 ○1 ●1
Since s is visible, ○ must point to a move in w, so either ● = a or ● = ●k, with 1 ≤ k < z, which
is what we wanted to show. ◂
Another well-known and simple-to-prove property of views ([22], pp. 330–332) that we recall
is that for every visible play s and player p, the p-view of s is itself a visible play.
3 Berardi-de’Liguoro Backtracking Level
We now introduce the Berardi-de’Liguoro notion [9] of backtracking level of a strategy, which
measures in a sophisticated and precise way the complexity of the backtracking moves made
by the strategy. We shall have to extend the notion to arbitrary plays between strategies
and investigate the resulting properties, thus continuing from where [9] stopped.
Our first goal is to describe the concept of “mind changing about a mind change” or
equivalently “retraction of a retraction”, which will be formalized as the binary inactivation
relation ◁ between edges of a play. The idea, here, is that in a play any edge that points to
a move back in the past of the play, implicitly erases, retracts, all the moves between the two
moves connected by the edge. A player act of pointing back to a past move, immediately
implies that he is not satisfied with his former reactions to that move. It does not matter
whether the reactions were ignoring the move altogether or answering it, the player has now
changed his mind: either he has chosen to stop ignoring the move and answer it, or he
decided to answer it differently. So, everything that was generated starting from his first
former reaction no longer interests him, and he discards that part of the history. To continue
the discussion we need the concept of crossing edges.
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∎ Definition 5 (Crossing Edges). Let s = s0 s1 . . . sn be a play over an arena A. We say that
the edge (sm1 , sn1) crosses the edge (sm2 , sn2), if
m2 <m1 < n2 < n1
which is represented in a picture as:
sm2 . . . sm1 . . . sn2 . . . sn1
We write e2↶ e1 whenever an edge e1 crosses an edge e2, that is when e2 is crossed by e1.
Now, how to interpret a situation in which a player edge is crossed by another edge of the
same player? This means that the player no longer agrees with his previous act of discarding
the history between the ending points of the first edge. He wants to access something that
was erased, he retracts his retraction. It is tempting to say that if an edge is crossed by
another edge, then the latter always represents a mind change about the retraction made
by the former and thus that the latter inactivates the former. This definition would not
technically work: we shall see this in the discussion before Proposition 9, which should be
already enough of a reason to stop considering the idea. However, such a definition would be
just wrong in itself and inconsistent with our discussion. Consider the following situation:
. . . ●1 . . . ●2 . . . ○1 . . . ○2 . . . ○3
If we assume the second edge ↖ ○2 inactivates the first edge ↖ ○1, then the moves between
●1 and ○1 may very well be accessible at the moment of the move ○3; in other words, since
the second edge ↖ ○2 has already retracted the first retraction ↖ ○1, the third edge ↖ ○3
retracts nothing at all, even if it crosses the first. The point is that the first edge is active at
the moment the second edge is played, while it could be inactive, i.e. not “existing”, when
the third edge is played. An edge is said to be inactive if there is an active edge crossing
it: a real later retraction. An edge is said to be active if all edges crossing it are inactive:
no real retractions. One edge is inactivated by another one, if the former is active at the
very moment in which the latter is created. Since in order to determine whether an edge is
active or inactive the future of the play is involved, the Berardi-de’Liguoro Definition 6 of
activity and the inactivation relation is by backward induction.
∎ Definition 6 (Active and Inactive Edges of a Play, Inactivation). Let s = s0 s1 . . . sn be a
play over an arena A.
We define by backward induction, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, whether the edge from si is active or
inactive in s.
1. ↖ sn is active.
2. ↖ si, with i < n, is inactive if there is a j > i such that ↖ si↶↖ sj and ↖ sj is active.
3. ↖ si, with i < n, is active if for all j > i, if ↖ si↶↖ sj , then ↖ sj is inactive.
We say that ↖ si inactivates ↖ sj in s or that ↖ sj is inactivated by ↖ si in s, and
write sj◁ si in s, if ↖ sj is active in s0 s1 . . . si−1 and ↖ sj↶↖ si.
The combinatorial power of the definition lies in its logical complexity: the condition de-
termining whether a edge is active or inactive in a play is a formula with possibly as many
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alternating quantifiers as the length of the play. We remark that the concept of inactivation
is always relative to a specified play and has a temporal connotation; we will always make
sure to declare with respect to what play the inactivation relation is considered. As an
example of active and inactive edges, let us consider the following visible play:
●1 ○1 ●2 ○2 ●3 ○3 ●4 ○4 ●5
The edges ↖ ●5 are ↖ ○4 active in the whole play, thus the edge ↖ ○3 is inactive and the
edge ↖ ○2 is active in the whole play. Moreover, ↖ ○3 is active in the initial segment of
the play ending with the move ●4, therefore ↖ ○3◁↖ ○4. However, it is not the case that
↖ ○3◁↖ ●5, for ↖ ○3 is inactive in the initial segment of the play ending with the move ○4.
The time has come to define the backtracking level of a move, play and strategy. The
idea is to consider the chain of mind changes that originates from a move. A move might
be a simple retraction, and thus have backtracking level 1, or it might be a retraction of a
retraction, and thus have backtracking level 2, or it might be a retraction of a retraction of
a retraction, and thus have backtracking level 3. In general, one measures the length of a
maximal chain of such retractions of retractions. More formally, given a move a, if a does
not retract anything because it answers the immediately previous move, then it is declared
to have backtracking level 0. Otherwise, one defines the backtracking level of a as the length
k + 1 of a maximal chain of the shape e1◁ e2◁ . . . ◁ek◁↖ a; in particular, if there is no
e such that e◁a, the backtracking level of a is 1. The backtracking level of a play is the
maximum backtracking level of its moves, while the backtracking level of a bounded strategy
is the maximum among the backtracking levels of the views of the plays in it.
∎ Definition 7 (Backtracking level of a Move, Play and Strategy). Let s = s0 s1 . . . sn be a
play over an arena A.
We define by induction, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the backtracking level in s of the move si
(Blevel(si)) as following.
If (si−1, si) is an edge of s or i = 0, then Blevel(si) = 0.
If (si−1, si) is not an edge of s and i > 0, then Blevel(si) = k + 1, where k is the length of
the longest chain e1, e2, . . . , ek of edges of s such that in s
e1◁ e2◁ . . . ◁ ek◁↖ si
We define the backtracking level of the play s as:
Blevel(s) = max{Blevel(si) ∣ 0 ≤ i ≤ n}
We define the backtracking level of the player p in the play s as:
pBlevel(s) = max{Blevel(si) ∣ 0 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ λ(si) = p}
For any bounded Player strategy σ, we define its backtracking level as:
Blevel(σ) =max{Blevel(⌜s⌝) ∣ s ∈ σ}
For any bounded Opponent strategy σ, we define its backtracking level as:
Blevel(σ) =max{Blevel(⌞s⌟) ∣ s ∈ σ}
If Blevel(σ) = n, we say that σ is a n-backtracking strategy.
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Let us consider the following example:
●1 ○1 ●2 ○2 ●3 ○3 ●4 ○4
The move ○1 is of backtracking level 0, ○2 of backtracking level 1, ○3 of backtracking level 2
and ○4 of backtracking level 3. But in the following play
●1 ○1 ●2 ○2 ●3 ○3 ●4 ○4
○4 is of backtracking level 1, since in the initial segment of the play terminating with ●4 the
edge ↖ ○3 is active and thus ↖ ○2 inactive.
4 Ideas of the Proof
We now have all the tools needed first to enter and then survive the agitated waters of
complexity analysis. In order not to lose ourselves in the details before reaching the final
destination, we trace a map with the principal objectives to achieve and their role in our
proof. The lowest layer of our proof strategy is built upon some reflections about two crucial
features of Coquand’s proof of debate termination [15], so it is wise to look back at it first.
4.1 Back to Coquand’s proof: Uncrossed Edges and the Trimming
Operation
Coquand proved in [15] that in any arena of finite depth debates between well-founded
strategies always terminate. The proof’s main idea is to consider the so called orphan
moves, which are those moves that during the debate under focus are not directly answered
by any later move. One can easily prove than in any visible play s, the edges from such
moves can never be crossed. If we cut away from s all the moves that are in the interior of
an edge from some orphan move, removing also the edge’s ending points, we obtain again a
visible play s′. This play takes place by construction in an arena of depth strictly less than
the original one, because all the moves of maximal depth are removed from the original play
s. Therefore one can argue by induction that s′ is of finite length and then easily calculate
the length of the original play s. Interestingly, if we ignore all the other edges of the play,
the edges from orphan moves can be seen from outside as 1-backtracking moves, because
they never cross each other. Thus if we watch the play flowing from left to right like a
sequence of photograms and, as soon as an edge from an orphan move appears, we erase all
the moves in its interior, we see a 1-backtracking game [11], for example of the form:
○1; ○1 ○2; ○1 ○2 ○3; ○1 ○2 ○3 ○4; ○1; ○1 ○5; ○1 ○5 ○6; ○1 ○5 ○6 ○7; ○1 ○5; . . .
That is, each sequence of moves is either an extension or an initial segment of the previous
sequence. These 1-backtracking plays are easy to bound, so the proof goes through.
4.2 The Max-Min Choice Technique
If one thinks carefully about the argument above, one can identify two crucial features:
1. a choice of edges with the property that they cannot be crossed by any other edge;
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2. a trimming operation that cuts away some unwanted part of the original play – the moves
in the intervals defined by the previously chosen edges – to produce a play in an arena
of lower depth.
The problem is that the induction that one winds up to employ is on the depth of the arena.
Thus Coquand’s argument yields again the old, well-known tower of exponentials, as high
as the depth of the arena. If we want to obtain finer results, we need a more sophisticated
induction. The idea is to choose differently the edges to remove and thus make use of a
different trimming operation:
1. we choose as edges to remove those from the moves of maximal backtracking level among
those made by the player with minimal backtracking level in the play;
2. the trimming operation cuts away some unwanted part of the original play – those moves
contained in the interior of the previously chosen edges – to produce a play in which the
previously chosen player has backtracking level strictly less than in the original play.
These concepts inspire the following definition.
∎ Definition 8 (Real Backtracking Level of a Play, Principal Player). Let s be a visible play.
Let n be the backtracking level of Player in s and m the backtracking level of Opponent
in s. We define the real backtracking level of s as min(n,m). If min(n,m) = n, then
Player is called the principal player of s; otherwise, Opponent is the principal player
of s.
According to this terminology, the proof strategy described above identifies the moves by
the principal player of a play that have backtracking level equal to the real backtracking
level of the play. We speak of real backtracking level, because thanks to the deep symmetry
between the two players of the game, one can choose to look at a play with the eyes of the
principal player. If one looks instead at the very same play from the perspective of the other
player, one sees an apparent backtracking level higher than the real one and thus the play
looks, wrongly, more complex than really is.
With this approach, we can make a refined induction on the backtracking level of the
principal player of the play, thus obtaining a tower of exponential possibly much lower than
the old, well-known one. However, we shall need a lot of technical preparatory study to
make our proof strategy succeed. The fact that one can focus just on the principal player of
a play is surprising. Actually, it may seem a stroke of luck that such an argument can work,
because it faces many obstructions that we are going to describe in a moment. As a matter
of fact, we discovered our results by means of a more intuitive geometrical proof; as it was
much more difficult to formalize, we discarded it and turned to the present approach.
4.3 Obstacles
The first obstacle to address is the following. Given a visible play, consider the edges from
the moves of maximal backtracking level among those made by the principal player p, that
is the one with minimal backtracking level in the play: can these edges be crossed? It is
not trivial that they do not – let alone that they can assume the role that orphan moves
have in Coquand’s proof. Since the other player p may have backtracking level greater than
that of p, the edge from some p-move could in principle cross and inactivate the edge from
a p-move of maximal backtracking level among those of p. Therefore, we need to prove that
this cannot happen: it will be a task of Section §5.
The second obstacle to address is: if two strategies interact together, what is the
backtracking level of the resulting play? Could it be, for example, that if a Player strategy
has backtracking level 2 and an Opponent strategy has backtracking level 5, then in the
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play resulting from their interaction Player has backtracking level 5 or even 5+2, due to the
interference of the Opponent moves? In Section §5, we rule out this possibility and show
that in the resulting play the backtracking level of Player is still 2 and that of Opponent
still 5. This is not obvious, because chains of crossing edges of length 5 + 2 could pop up at
any moment in the play.
The third obstacle to address is whether the Trimming operation really transforms a
visible play, first of all, into a visible play, secondly, into a play in which the principal player
of the initial play has backtracking level strictly smaller. In Coquand’s proof the Trimming
operation is easily shown to transform visible plays into visible plays; in our proof we shall
have to investigate in depth the shape of views to check that it is the case. The study will
be carried out in Section §6.
There is a last tricky fourth obstacle to address. What if a strategy has backtracking
level greater than the depth of the arena? This is a curious situation, but the answer is
essentially: such a strategy is badly defined. Section §8 will settle the matter: it will be
shown that inserting some dummy moves in a strategy, that form a sort of switch-on/switch-
off graph-theoretic gadget, one can get a strategy of backtracking level less than or equal
to the depth of the arena. The same can be done with an arbitrary play. This provides
conclusive evidence that in principle, a strategy should never have backtracking level greater
than the depth of the correspondent arena: if it does, it has been constructed in a careless
manner.
5 Maximal Edges and The Max-Min Theorem of Backtracking Levels
Interaction
In this Section we establish several key properties of the inactivation relation between edges,
removing the first two obstacles in our way to the main results. Namely, we shall see that
the edges from the moves of maximal backtracking level, among those of one player, cannot
be crossed, let alone inactivated. Moreover, we will show that any interaction between two
strategies of backtracking level respectively n and m is a play of backtracking level less than
or equal to the maximum among n and m and of real backtracking level less than or equal
to the minimum among n and m. We shall call this property the Max-Min Theorem of
Backtracking Levels Interaction.
We start off by proving that only the very same player that made a still active back-
tracking can retract it with another backtracking: in other terms, he alone has the power to
recover the moves that he himself “erased”. Unless he decides that those moves have to be
reconsidered, the other player will never be able to see them again. More precisely, if e is a
p-edge inactivated by the edge e′ in a visible play s, then e′ is a p-edge as well. Moreover,
the inactivation relation in s reflects exactly the inactivation relation in the views of s: if
two p-edges are in the inactivation relation in s and the second is in the p-view of s, then
they are in the inactivation relation also in the p-view of s, and vice versa. These properties
are due to the special nature of the inactivation relation and are absolutely essential for the
rest of the paper, so we check them carefully. Already the first would not hold with other
naive definitions of ◁ , namely if ◁ had been taken to be equal to the crossing relation ↶ .
For example, whenever in some visible play ↖ ○1↶↖ ○2, the move ● immediately following
the move ○2 is of opposite polarity and the corresponding player can see in the interior of
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the first edge and thus point to a move in it, enabling the crossing relation ↖ ○1↶↖ ●:
●1 ○ ●2 . . . ○1 . . . ○2 ●
From now on we fix an arena A = (M,⊢, λ, I) and we shall consider only plays over A.
∎ Proposition 9 (Preservation of Inactivations). Suppose s is a visible play, e is a p-edge of
s and e′ = (●,○) is another edge of s.
1. If e◁ e′ in s, then e′ is a p-edge.
2. Assume e′ is in the p-view w of s. Then e◁e′ in s if and only if e◁e′ in w.
Proof. Moves by p and p will be represented by different colors: for the moment we do not
assume that white is for p, nor that black is for p. We need first to establish some facts. By
hypothesis s = s′ ● s′′ ○ s′′′; by Proposition 4, s′′ = ○k . . . ●k ○k−1 . . . ●k−1 . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1
and
s = s′ ● ○k . . . ●k○k−1 . . . ●k−1
e′
. . . ○2 . . . ●2○1 . . . ●1 ○ s
′′′
We argue, by induction on i, that each edge (○i,●i), with 1 ≤ i ≤ k is active in s
′ ● s′′.
For i = 1, that holds, since (○1,●1) is crossed by no edge in s
′ ● s′′, being it the last edge.
So, suppose i > 1. Then
s = s′ ● ○k . . . ●k . . . ○i . . . ●i
e′
. . . ○2 . . . ●2○1 . . . ●1 ○ s
′′′
By induction hypothesis, for any j < i, (○j ,●j) is active in s
′ ● s′′; therefore every edge
from every move a lying between the moves ○j and ●j and such that ↖ a↶ (○j,●j), is by
Definition 6 inactive in s′ ● s′′. Then, the only active edges that could cross (○i,●i) are
those of the form ↖ ○j , for some j < i; but that cannot happen, because by visibility of s, ○j
must point to an element in the λ(○j)-view v of the play
s′ ● ○k . . . ●k . . . ○i . . . ●i . . . ○j+1 . . . ●j+1
and since v = v′ ● ○k ●k . . . ○i ●i . . . ○j+1 ●j+1, it is not the case that (○i,●i)↶↖ ○j in s.
1. Now, assume e◁e′ = (●,○) in s. By Definition 6 of the inactivation relation, e is active
in s′ ● s′′ and e↶ e′. For every move a lying between ○i and ●i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
such that ↖ a↶ (●,○), we deduce that ↖ a is inactive in s′ ● s′′, since ↖ a↶ (○i,●i) and
(○i,●i) is active in s
′ ● s′′. Therefore, it must be the case that e =↖ ○l, for some 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
which establishes that white is the color for p moves and that e′ is a p-edge.
2. Let w be the p-view of s. If e′ is not a p-edge, it is impossible both that e◁e′ in s, by
1., and that e◁e′ in w, because every p move in w points to the immediately preceding
move; thus the thesis is trivial. We can hence assume that e′ is a p-edge. Since e′ is in
w, for some sequences r, r′ we have
w = r ● ○k ●k ○k−1 ●k−1 . . . ○2 ●2 ○1 ●1 ○ r
′
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and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the edge (○i,●i) is in w. Let
w′ = r ● ○k ●k ○k−1 ●k−1 . . . ○2 ●2 ○1 ●1
We argue, by induction on i, that each edge ↖ ○i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, is active in w
′ if it is
active in s′ ● s′′ and is inactive in w′ if it is inactive in s′ ● s′′.
For i = 1, that holds, since ↖ ○1 is not crossed by any edge in w
′ and is thus active in
w′; moreover, ↖ ○1 is active in s
′ ● s′′, because (○1,●1) is active in s
′ ● s′′ and therefore
whenever ↖ ○1↶d with d in s
′ ● s′′, surely d ≠ (○1,●1), so one has d↶ (○1,●1) and so d
is inactive in s′ ● s′′.
So, suppose i > 1.
If ↖ ○i is active in s
′ ● s′′, all the edges ↖ ○j , such that j < i and ↖ ○i↶↖ ○j , are
inactive in s′ ● s′′; by induction hypothesis, they are inactive in w′ as well, and since
there is no other edge crossing ↖ ○i in w
′, we have that ↖ ○i is active in w
′.
If ↖ ○i is inactive in s
′ ● s′′, then there is an active edge d in s′ ● s′′ such that ↖ ○i↶d;
but d must be equal to ↖ ○j, for some j < i, since all the other edges crossing ↖ ○i are
inactive, because they are crossed by some active edge (○l,●l); by induction hypothesis,
↖ ○j is active in w
′, moreover ↖ ○i↶↖ ○j in w
′ and so ↖ ○i is inactive in w
′.
Finally, let us prove the thesis. Assume e◁e′ in s. By the proof of 1., e = ↖ ○l, with
1 ≤ l ≤ k, and e is active in s′ ● s′′ and thus in w′. Therefore e◁e′ in w. Assume now
e◁ e′ in w. Then e = ↖ ○l, with 1 ≤ l ≤ k, and e is active in w and thus in s
′ ● s′′.
Therefore e◁e′ in s.
◂
Proposition 10 below provides a simple way to compute the backtracking level of a play: it
is enough to determine the backtracking level of the views of its initial segments. This is
possible because the inactivation chains of a visible play are exactly those already contained
in the views of the play’s initial segments.
∎ Proposition 10 (Preservation of Inactivation Chains). Let s = s0 s1 . . . sk be a visible play.
Let e1, e2, . . . , en be edges of s, assume en = ↖ si is a p-edge, for some player p, and w is
the p-view of s0 s1 . . . si. Then
e1 ◁e2◁ . . . ◁ en in s ⇐⇒ e1◁ e2◁ . . . ◁en in w
Proof. Ô⇒) Assume e1 ◁e2◁ . . . ◁ en in s. By definition of view and visibility of s, en
belongs to the p-view w of s0 s1 . . . si. By repeated application of Proposition 9, en−1 ◁en
in w, en−2◁ en−1 in w, . . ., e1 ◁e2 in w, which is the thesis.
⇐Ô) As in the other direction. ◂
We prove now the key property of maximal backtracking moves and of the edges from them,
which states that if a player p of backtracking level n in some visible play has made a move of
backtracking level n, then the edge from that move cannot be crossed by any other edge, let
alone inactivated. These are the edges that will play the role that the edges from unanswered
moves played in Coquand’s termination proof [15].
∎ Proposition 11 (Maximal Backtracking Edges). Suppose s = s0 s1 . . . sk is a visible play and
p a player of backtracking level n in s. Assume λ(si) = p and Blevel(si) = n. Then there is
no j such that ↖ si↶↖ sj in s.
20 Game Semantics and the Geometry of Backtracking
Proof. Let us consider, for the sake of contradiction, the smallest j such that ↖ si↶↖ sj in
s. By choice of j, ↖ si is not crossed by any edge in s0 s1 . . . sj−1, therefore ↖ si is active in
s0 s1 . . . sj−1 and so↖ si◁↖ sj in s. By Proposition 9, ↖ sj is a p-edge. Since Blevel(si) = n,
there is in s an inactivation chain
e1◁e2 ◁ . . . ◁en−1 ◁↖ si◁↖ sj
But this means that sj and thus p are of backtracking level n+1 in s, which contradicts the
hypothesis. ◂
The next Theorem is the first major result of this paper: if two strategies respectively
of backtracking level n and m play one against the other, they generate a visible play of
backtracking level equal to the maximum among n and m. However, the strategy with
backtracking level equal to the minimum among n and m will maintain its backtracking
level also in the generated play. Therefore, the real backtracking level of the generated play
is equal to the minimum among n and m.
∎ Theorem 12 (Max-Min Property of Backtracking Levels Interaction). Let σ be a Player n-
backtracking strategy, τ an Opponent m-backtracking strategy and assume s ∈ σ ⋆ τ . Then s
is a visible play of backtracking level less than or equal to max(n,m) and of real backtracking
level less than or equal to min(n,m).
Proof. In order to prove that s is visible, suppose that s = s′ a. Assume λ(a) = P . Since
by Definition 3 of interaction, s′ a ∈ σ and s′ ∈ τ , and σ and τ are closed by even and odd
prefixes, every prefix of s belongs to σ or τ . Since σ and τ are visible, we are done. If
λ(a) = O, exchange σ and τ in the previous argument.
In order to prove the thesis, it is enough to show that Player and Opponent have backtracking
level in s less than or equal to respectively n and m. Suppose that c = e1◁ e2◁ . . . ◁ei
is an inactivation chain in s, where ei is a p-edge, for some player p. By Proposition 10, c
is an inactivation chain in the p-view w of the initial segment s′ of s terminating with the
p-move corresponding to ei. Since s
′ ∈ σ when p = P , and s′ ∈ τ when p = O, by Definition 7,
w has backtracking level less than or equal to n if p = P and less or equal than m if p = O.
We conclude that i ≤ n if p = P , and i ≤m if p = O. ◂
6 The Trimming Operation
In this Section we study the Trimming operation sketched in Section §4, we show that it
transforms visible plays into visible plays and we determine the resulting backtracking level,
thus removing the third obstacle in our way to the main results.
We will show in Proposition 18 that any visible play of real backtracking level n can
be interpreted as a sequence of visible plays of real backtracking level less than n. These
plays cannot grow infinitely and are compressed and stretched like springs by the player of
backtracking level n, who, having a finite amount of energy, at some point must stop. In
order to identify such sequence of plays, we want to describe an operation of identifying in
any visible play s of real backtracking level n a subsequence which represents a visible play
s′ of real backtracking level strictly less than n. The idea is to erase whatever has been
retracted by moves of backtracking level n: the sequence s′ is obtained from s by removing
all the moves that are in the interior of an edge from any move of backtracking level n made
by the principal player of s. More generally, we define an operation removing every move
which is in the interior of an edge from a move of some fixed backtracking level made by a
fixed player.
Game Semantics and the Geometry of Backtracking 21
∎ Definition 13 (Trimming of a Play). Suppose s = s0 s1 . . . sk is any visible play, n ∈ N, n > 0
and p a player. Let µ = (n, p). We define sµ as the subsequence of s obtained from s by
removing all the moves sl such that for some i, j it holds: a) j < l < i and ↖ si = (sj , si); b)
Blevel(si) = n and λ(si) = p.
It will be useful to exploit the following simple characterization of the Trimming operation.
∎ Lemma 14. Suppose s = s0 s1 . . . sk is any visible play, p a player of backtracking level n
in s and µ = (n, p).
1. If Blevel(si) ≠ n or λ(si) ≠ p, then
(s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
= (s0 s1 . . . si−1)
µ
si
2. If Blevel(si) = n and λ(si) = p, assuming ↖ si = (sj , si), then
(s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
= (s0 s1 . . . sj)
µ
si
3. Assume
s = r ○z . . . ●z . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1 r
′
and that: r is the empty sequence or r ∈ I; r′ = si . . . sk and either ●1 is in s
µ or si in s
µ;
for 1 ≤ i ≤ z, ●i+1 immediately precedes ○i and there is an edge (○i,●i) in s. Then
sµ = r ○im . . . ●im . . . ○i2 . . . ●i2 ○i1 . . . ●i1 r
′′
where r′′ is a subsequence of r′ and 1 ≤ i1 < i2 . . . < im ≤ z.
Proof.
1. By hypothesis Blevel(si) ≠ n or λ(si) ≠ p. Therefore the moves sl, with l < i, that are in
(s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
, are exactly those in (s0 s1 . . . si−1)
µ
; since si is in (s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
, we obtain
the thesis.
2. For no l, l′, with l′ < j < l < i, it is the case that Blevel(sl) = n and a p-edge (sl′ , sl) is in
s, otherwise ↖ sl↶↖ si, which is impossible by Proposition 11. Therefore the moves sl,
with l ≤ j, that are in (s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
, are exactly those in (s0 s1 . . . sj)
µ
. Moreover all the
moves sl, with j < l < i are not in (s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
, which is the thesis.
3. By hypothesis
s = r ○z . . . ●z . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1 r
′
where, for 1 ≤ j ≤ z, ●j+1 immediately precedes ○j and there is an edge (○j,●j) in s. We
must show
sµ = r ○im . . . ●im . . . ○i2 . . . ●i2 ○i1 . . . ●i1 r
′′
By hypothesis r′ = si . . . sk and either ●1 is in s
µ or ○0 ∶= si is in s
µ; therefore, every p
move sl of s, such that Blevel(sl) = n and i < l, points in s to a move sl′ , with i − 1 ≤ l
′.
What we have to show now is that for every l, with 1 ≤ l ≤ z: i) if ●l is in s
µ, then ○l is
in sµ as well, and ii) if ●l is not in s
µ, then ○l and all the moves between ○l and ●l are
not in sµ either. s is represented as:
r ○z . . . ●z . . . ○l . . . ●l . . . ○2 . . . ●2○1 . . . ●1 r
′
To show i), assume ●l is in s
µ and, for the sake of contradiction, that ○l is not in it. Then
there is a p move a in s such that Blevel(a) = n, a points in s to a move on the left of ○l,
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a is on the right of ○l but it is not the case that a is on the right of ●l. This means that
a lies between ○l and ●l. But then ↖ a↶ (○l,●l), impossible by Proposition 11.
To show ii), assume ●l is not in s
µ and, for the sake of contradiction, that either ○l or some
move between ○l and ●l is in it. Then there is a p move a such that Blevel(a) = n, and
(○l,●l)↶↖ a or a points to ○l. As before, a cannot lie between ○h and ●h, for any h < l,
otherwise ↖ a↶ (○h,●h), impossible by Proposition 11. We have already showed that a
cannot lie on the right of the first move of r′. Therefore a = ○h, for some 0 ≤ h < l. But
by visibility of s, this is impossible: ○h should point to one of the moves ●1,●2, . . . ,●z, r.
◂
The Trimming operation takes a visible play s and returns a sequence of moves sµ. It is not
evident that sµ is a visible play, for we have not yet studied in detail the shape of the views
in sµ, nor it is immediate to assess what is the backtracking level of sµ. This study will be
carried out in Proposition 15 below, where we establish that views in sµ are nothing but
subsequences of views in s. Moreover, if µ = (n, p) and p has backtracking level n in s, then
p has backtracking level less than or equal to n−1 in sµ. Thus sµ is exactly the subsequence
of s we were looking for: a visible play where p plays only moves with backtracking level
strictly less than n.
∎ Proposition 15 (Properties of Trimming). Suppose s = s0 s1 . . . sk is any visible play, p a
player of backtracking level n > 0 in s and µ = (n, p). Then:
1. For any player q, the q-view of any initial segment IM of sµ is a subsequence of the
q-view of the initial segment IS of s that ends with the last move of IM .
2. sµ is a visible play.
3. p is in sµ of backtracking level less than or equal to n − 1.
Proof.
1. By induction on s. Let IM be any initial segment of sµ and let si = ○ its last move. Let
us fix also a player q. We have two cases:
λ(○) = q. We can write s as
s = r ○z . . . ●z . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1 ○ . . . sk
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ z, ●i+1 immediately precedes ○i and there is an edge (○i,●i) in s and
r ∈ I or r is the empty sequence. By Lemma 14, point 3,
sµ = r ○im . . . ●im . . . ○i2 . . . ●i2 ○i1 . . . ●i1 ○ . . . sk
for some sequence of numbers 1 ≤ i1 < i2 . . . < im ≤ z. Therefore
IM = r ○im . . . ●im . . . ○i2 . . . ●i2 ○i1 . . . ●i1 ○
IS = r ○z . . . ●z . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1 ○
Now, assuming that r′ is the q-view of r, the q-view of IM is
r′ ○im ●im . . . ○i2 ●i2 ○i1 ●i1 ○
while the q-view of IS is
r′ ○z ●z . . . ○2 ●2 ○1 ●1 ○
which is what we wanted to show.
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λ(○) ≠ q. Letting ○1 = ○, we can write s as
s = r ●z . . . ○z . . . ●2 . . . ○2 ●1 . . . ○1 . . . sk
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ z, ○i+1 immediately precedes ●i and there is an edge (●i,○i) in s and
r ∈ I or r is the empty sequence. As ○1 is in s
µ, by Lemma 14, point 3, we have
sµ = r ●im . . . ○im . . . ●i1 . . . ○i1 ●1 . . . ○1 . . . sk
for some sequence of numbers 1 < i1 < i2 . . . < im ≤ z. Therefore
IM = r ●im . . . ○im . . . ●i1 . . . ○i1 ●1 . . . ○1
IS = r ●z . . . ○z . . . ●2 . . . ○2 ●1 . . . ○1
Now, assuming that r′ is the q-view of r, the q-view of IM is
r′ ●im ○im . . . ●i1 ○i1 ●1 ○1
while the q-view of IS is
r′ ●z ○z . . . ●2 ○2 ●1 ○1
which is what we wanted to show.
2. First of all, sµ is a justified sequence: if in s there is an edge (sj , si) and si is in s
µ,
then sj must be in s
µ as well, otherwise there would be an index l such that j < l < i,
λ(sl) = p, Blevel(sl) = n in s and ↖ sl↶ (sj , si); by Proposition 11, that is impossible.
To show that sµ is visible, assume that ○ is the last move of an initial segment IM of sµ,
with λ(○) = q, and that IS is the initial segment of s ending with the last move of IM .
We can write s as
s = r ○z . . . ●z . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1 ○ . . . sk
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ z, ●i+1 immediately precedes ○i and there is an edge (○i,●i) in s and
r ∈ I or r is the empty sequence. By Lemma 14, point 3.,
sµ = r ○im . . . ●im . . . ○i2 . . . ●i2 ○i1 . . . ●i1 ○ . . . sk
for some sequence of numbers 1 ≤ i1 < i2 . . . < im ≤ z. Therefore
IM = r ○im . . . ●im . . . ○i2 . . . ●i2 ○i1 . . . ●i1 ○
IS = r ○z . . . ●z . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1 ○
Now, assuming that r′ is the q-view of r, by point 1., the q-view of IM is
r′ ○im ●im . . . ○i2 ●i2 ○i1 ●i1 ○
while the q-view of IS is
r′ ○z ●z . . . ○2 ●2 ○1 ●1 ○
We have to show that ○ points in IM to r or some ●in , with 1 ≤ n ≤m. Since s is visible,
○ points in IS to r or some ●l, with 1 ≤ l ≤ z. But since IM is justified, ●l is in IM , and
thus l = in, with 1 ≤ n ≤ z.
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3. We first show that for every edge e = (sj, si) of s
µ, e is active in an initial segment r′ of
sµ if and only if e is active in the initial segment r of s ending with the last move of r′.
We proceed by induction on k − i.
If i = k, then e = (sj, sk), r
′ = sµ and r = s, so e must be active both in r′ and r, for it is
the last edge of both plays.
If i < k, we prove separately the two directions of the implication.
For one direction, suppose that e is active in r′: we want to show that e is active also
in r, and thus that if e′ = (sj′ , si′) is an edge of r such that e↶e
′, then e′ is inactive
in r. Now, if e′ is in r′, then e′ is inactive in r′, and by induction hypothesis e′ is
inactive also in r. So suppose e′ is not in r′. Then, there is a p-edge e′′ = (sj′′ , si′′) in
s such that Blevel(si′′) = n in s and j
′′ < i′ < i′′. A picture may be useful to summarize
how s looks like:
. . . sj . . . sj′
e
. . . si
e′
. . . si′ . . . ↖ si′′ . . .
We are first going to determine where si′′ points to, that is, where sj′′ lies. Since si is
in r′, it holds i ≤ j′′ and we already know that j′′ < i′; therefore e′↶e′′. Hence s is of
the shape
. . . sj . . . sj′ . . . si
e
. . .
e′
sj′′ . . . si′
e′′
. . . si′′ . . .
Finally, let sl be the last move of r. By hypothesis, sl is also in r
′. Moreover, since
i′ ≤ l, it is not the case that l < i′′: otherwise, sl would not be in r
′. We conclude that
e′′ is in r and, since by Proposition 11 e′′ is active in r, by definition e′ is inactive in
r.
For the other direction, suppose that e is active in r: we want to show that e is active
also in r′, and thus that if e′ is an edge of r′ such that e↶ e′, e′ is inactive in r′. Indeed,
since e′ is in r′, it is as well in r; hence, e′ is inactive in r. By induction hypothesis,
e′ is inactive in r′ as well.
Suppose now that e◁e′ in sµ; we want to show that e◁e′ in s as well. Indeed, let us
consider the shortest initial segment r′ of sµ that contains e and e′; let r be the initial
segment of s ending with the last move of r′. By Proposition 9, e = (●,○) and e′ = (●′,○′),
with λ(○) = λ(○′). Then for some move ●′′, we have
r = . . . ● . . . ●′ . . . ○ . . . ●′′ ○′
and we claim that r′ must be of the shape
r′ = ⋯ ●⋯ ●′ ⋯○⋯ ●′′ ○′
possibly with fewer moves than r: we have just to check that ●′′ must be in r′. Indeed, we
have λ(○′) ≠ p or Blevel(○′) ≠ n in s, otherwise ○ would not be in r′; moreover, no move
in s different from ○′ can point to the left of ●′′ without pointing to the left of ○′, which
implies that if ●′′ was not in r′, also ○′ would not in r′, a contradiction. Since e◁ e′ in sµ,
e is active in the sequence obtained from r′ by removing the last move: ⋯●⋯●′⋯○⋯●′′;
therefore, by what we have just proved, e is active in the sequence obtained from r by
removing the last move: . . . ● . . . ●′ . . . ○ . . .●′′. We conclude that e◁e′ in r and thus in s.
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We are finally able to prove the thesis: suppose e is a p-edge from a move of backtracking
level n − 1 in sµ; we must show that for no edge e′, e◁e′ in sµ. Indeed, suppose e◁ e′
in sµ. Then, there is in sµ an inactivation chain c = e1◁ . . . ◁ en−2◁ e◁e
′. We have
proved that c must be an inactivation chain also in s. Therefore, by Proposition 9, e′
is a p-edge from a move of backtracking level n in s; since e↶e′, e should not be in sµ,
contradicting our hypothesis.
◂
7 Upper Bounds on the Length of Interactions
In this Section, we establish our main results about the length of visible plays and interac-
tions between bounded strategies.
We first introduce another numerical measure comp(s, i) of how complex is a move si in
a play s, which is very different from the backtracking level of si: it represents how advanced
the move is in the current view. Given this association between moves of a play and numbers,
we can map each visible play s into a sequence of numbers, which represents its complexity.
The complexity compµ(s) of s
µ is instead defined as the restriction of the complexity of s to
sµ: in other terms, compµ(s) is the sequence of the complexities that the moves of s
µ have
in s. The lexicographic ordering ≺ of finite sequences of numbers is then used to order the
complexities of plays.
∎ Definition 16 (Complexity of Moves and Plays, Lexicographic Ordering ≺). Let s = s0 s1 . . . sk
be a visible play.
Assume 0 ≤ i ≤ k. We define the complexity of si in s, denoted with comp(s, i), as the
length of ⌜s0 s1 . . . si⌝ if λ(si) = P , as the length of ⌞s0 s1 . . . si⌟ if λ(si) = O.
Let n ∈ N, p be a player and µ = (n, p). Suppose sµ = si0 si1 . . . sim . We define
compµ(s) = comp(s, i0) comp(s, i1) . . . comp(s, im)
Let s = a0 a1 . . . an and r = b0 b1 . . . bm be two sequences of natural numbers. We define
that s ≺ r if and only if either
n <m ∧ ∀i. 0 ≤ i ≤ n Ô⇒ ai = bi
or
∃k. 0 ≤ k ≤ n ∧ (∀i. 0 ≤ i < k Ô⇒ ai = bi) ∧ ak < bk
The next Proposition 17 is simple, but is really crucial: it says that if a player answers
an adversary move, this answer is more complex than the player’s first reaction to that
move and than any of his other previous non-retracted answers to that move. Intuitively,
changing one’s mind and backtracking costs, and this cost prevents the backtracking during
a play between bounded strategies to be unlimited. This phenomenon was also noticed and
exploited by Coquand ([15], pp. 332).
∎ Proposition 17. Let s = s0 s1 . . . sk be a visible play and (sj , si) is a p-edge of s, with
i ≠ j + 1. Then:
1. comp(s, j + 1) < comp(s, i).
2. Suppose that j < l < i, that (sj , sl) is an edge of s and for no egde e of s, (sj , sl)↶ e.
Then comp(s, l) < comp(s, i).
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Proof. By Proposition 4
s0 . . . si = s0 . . . sj ○z . . . ●z . . . ○2 . . . ●2 ○1 . . . ●1 si
where, for 1 ≤ n ≤ z, ●n+1 immediately precedes ○n and there is an edge (○n,●n) in s. Since
(sj, sl) is crossed by no edge of s, it must be the case that sl = ○h, with 1 ≤ h ≤ z. Thus to
prove 1. and 2. simultaneously, it is enough to assume sn = ○h, with 1 ≤ h ≤ z, and show
comp(s,n) < comp(s, i). Indeed, let v be the p-view of s0 . . . sj ; si and ○h are p moves, so
the p-view of s0 . . . si is
v ○z ●z . . . ○h+1 ●h+1 ○h ●h . . . ○2 ●2 ○1 ●1 si
and the p-view of s0 . . . ○h is
v ○z ●z . . . ○h+1 ●h+1○h
As sn = ○h, we get comp(s,n) < comp(s, i). ◂
We now prove that any visible play s0 s1 . . . sk in which some player p has backtracking level
n can be seen as a sequence of visible plays in which p has backtracking level strictly less than
n. The plays of the sequence are obtained just by applying the Trimming operation, with
µ = (n, p), from left to right to all initial segments of s. The plays are each less complex than
the next one, according to the relation ≺. More precisely, define ri = s0 s1 . . . si. If we imagine
to watch the sequence (r0)
µ
, (r1)
µ
, . . . , (rk)
µ
as a succession of photograms, we would see
that for some time the (ri)
µ
are extended by one element, then they are reduced by removing
some final segment, then they are extended again, and so forth. Something like a spring,
which is stretched for some time, then suddenly is compressed only to be stretched again and
so on: a sort of 1-backtracking game [11], as we observed in Section §4. Moreover, this series
of extensions and compressions come with a cost: compµ(r0) ≺ compµ(r1) ≺ . . . ≺ compµ(rk).
∎ Proposition 18 (Spring Property). Let s = s0 s1 . . . sk be a visible play, p a player of
backtracking level n > 0 in s and µ = (n, p). Then, whenever 1 ≤ i < k, it holds
compµ(s0 s1 . . . si) ≺ compµ(s0 s1 . . . si+1)
Proof. There are two possibilities: either Blevel(si+1) = n and λ(si+1) = p or not.
i) Suppose Blevel(si+1) = n and λ(si+1) = p. Assume ↖ si+1 = (sj , si+1). Then j ≠ i, since
n > 0, and by Lemma 14 (point 2. and 1.)
(s0 s1 . . . si+1)
µ
= (s0 s1 . . . sj−1)
µ
sj si+1
Moreover, λ(si) = λ(sj) ≠ p and for every l such that j < l ≤ i, λ(sl) = p and Blevel(sl) = n
in s, it is not the case that ↖ sl = (sh, sl) with h < j, otherwise ↖ sl↶↖ si+1 and by
Proposition 11 it is impossible. Therefore, since i ≠ j + 1, there is an l such that j < l < i
(s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
= (s0 s1 . . . sj−1)
µ
sj sl . . . si
Now, either l = j + 1 or λ(sl) = p, Blevel(sl) = n in s and (sj , sl) is in s (because if we
assume l ≠ j + 1, then sj+1 is not in (s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
, thus it must hold that for some h, with
j + 1 < h ≤ l, λ(sh) = p, Blevel(sh) = n and (sj , sh) is in s; moreover, h = l, because sh must
be in (s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
, since ↖ sh is crossed by no edge by Proposition 11); in either case, by
Propositions 11 and 17, comp(s, l) < comp(s, i + 1), thus we get
compµ(s0 s1 . . . si) = compµ(s0 s1 . . . sj−1) comp(s, j) comp(s, l) . . . comp(s, i)
≺ compµ(s0 s1 . . . sj−1) comp(s, j) comp(s, i + 1)
= compµ(s0 s1 . . . si+1)
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ii) Suppose Blevel(si+1) ≠ n or λ(si+1) ≠ p. Then, by Lemma 14 (point 1.)
(s0 s1 . . . si+1)
µ
= (s0 s1 . . . si)
µ
si+1
Therefore
compµ(s0 s1 . . . si) ≺ compµ(s0 s1 . . . si) comp(s, i + 1) = compµ(s0 s1 . . . si+1)
◂
Finally, we are able to prove our first main Theorem, which tells that the length of any
visible play of real backtracking level b is bounded by a tower of exponentials of height b+1.
More precisely, define the hyperexponential function amn , with a,n,m ∈ N, by: a
m
0 = m
and amn+1 = a
a
m
n ; then we prove the following statement.
∎ Theorem 19 (Abstract Min-Backtracking-Theorem). Suppose s = s0 s1 . . . sl is a visible play
of real backtracking level b, p is the principal player of s, k is the length of the longest p-view
or p-view of an initial segment of s. Then
l ≤ kk
.
.
k
k
dcurly
b+1
≤ 22
.
.
2k(log k)⋅2
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b+1
= 2
k(logk)2
b
Proof. We prove the first inequality, by induction on b.
Case b = 0. For every p move sj , with j > 0, Blevel(sj) = 0, so one has by definition
↖ sj = (sj−1, sj). Therefore, for every i, the p-view of s0 s1 . . . si is s0 s1 . . . si. Since the
length of p-views is bounded by k, we conclude l = k, which is what we wanted to show.
Case b > 0. Let µ = (b, p). For every i, with 0 ≤ i ≤ l, let ri = s0 s1 . . . si. By Proposition
18
compµ(r0) ≺ compµ(r1) ≺ compµ(r2) ≺ . . . ≺ compµ(rl)
By Proposition 15, for every i, p has in (ri)
µ
backtracking level less than or equal to b−1
and no view of no initial segment of (ri)
µ
is longer than k, thus by induction hypothesis
(ri)
µ
is no longer than
n = kk
.
.
k
k
dcurly
b
Moreover, for every 0 ≤m ≤ l, comp(s,m) ≤ k. Therefore the set of sequences
{compµ(ri) ∣ 0 ≤ i ≤ l}
has cardinality less than or equal to kn. By Definition 16 of ≺, we conclude that l ≤ kn,
which is the first inequality we wanted to show.
Now, let us prove by induction on i ∈ N that kki ≤ 2
(k+i) logk
i . If i = 0, then k
k
i = k and
2
(k+i) logk
i = k logk, and we are done. Moreover, by induction hypothesis and standard
inequalities:
kki+1 = k
kk
i = 2k
k
i
logk ≤
≤ 22
(k+i) log k
i
logk ≤ 22
(k+i) log k
i
2
log k
i ≤ 22
(k+i) log k+log k
i = 22
(k+i+1) log k
i = 2
(k+i+1) logk
i+1
Since by Proposition 10, b ≤ k, we conclude
l ≤ kkb ≤ 2
(k+b) logk
b ≤ 2
(k+k) logk
b
◂
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We now readily prove our second main Theorem: bounded strategies have only finite inter-
actions, whose length is bounded by a tower of exponentials of height equal to the minimum
among the backtracking levels of the strategies plus one.
∎Theorem 20 (Min-Backtracking-Theorem). Let σ be a Player n-backtracking strategy bounded
by k, τ an Opponent m-backtracking strategy bounded by k and b = min(n,m). Assume
s ∈ σ ⋆ τ and s = s0 s1 . . . sl. Then
l ≤ kk
.
.
k
k
dcurly
b+1
≤ 22
.
.
2k(log k)⋅2
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b+1
= 2
k(logk)2
b
Proof. By Theorem 12, s is visible and of real backtracking level b. By Definition 3 of σ ⋆ τ ,
every initial segment s′ of s is in σ or τ and since both strategies are bounded by k, ⌜s′⌝ ≤ k
and ⌞s′⌟ ≤ k. By Theorem 19,
l ≤ kk
.
.
k
k
dcurly
b+1
≤ 22
.
.
2k(log k)⋅2
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b+1
◂
8 Backtracking Level and Arena Depth
In this Section, we study the relationship between backtracking level and arena depth, re-
moving the fourth and last obstacle in our way to our main result. One would expect that all
plays and strategies relative to an arena of depth d have backtracking level at most equal to
d. But the following example shows that a badly specified strategy may have backtracking
level 6 in an arena of depth 5:
∗ ●1 ○1 ●2 ○2 ●3 ○3 ●4 ○4 ●5 ○5 ●6 ○6 ●7 ○7 ●8 ○8 ●9 ○9 ●10
For the sake of legibility we have not displayed the edges from the moves ●3,●4,●5, which
are all supposed to point to ∗. We have↖ ●2◁↖ ●6◁↖ ●7◁↖ ●8 ◁↖ ●9 ◁↖ ●10, therefore
●10 is of backtracking level 6. Of course, there is nothing special about the number 6: this
construction can be generalized to produce strategies with as great a backtracking level as
one wishes. The pattern is: the first n black moves point to ∗, the following n black moves
point to the move that comes exactly 2(n − 1) moves before.
This example notwithstanding, we are going to show that, by inserting some dummy
moves into any play relative to an arena of depth d ≥ 2, we can lower the backtracking level
of the play to d − 2.
How? For energy saving reasons, turning off the light when leaving a room is in order.
Likewise, to avoid that the backtracking level of a strategy or of a play grows arbitrarily, it
is enough to inactivate backtracking edges immediately after they have been played. This
idea can be implemented by inserting in any play some administrative moves, whose only
purpose is to lower the backtracking level of a selected player, in our case O. We insert a
pair of moves 6 7 immediately after every P move. In this way, before any non-starting O
move ● there will be the move 7 and immediately after the P move ○ that follows ● there
will be the move 6. The sequence 7 ● ○6 forms what we call an inactivation gadget: 7
“turns on” the edge from ●, while 6 “turns it off”. We would want the move 6 to simply
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point back to the nearest occurrence of 7. That works when the play is an O-view, but in
general, to preserve visibility, 6 must refer back to an occurrence of 7 which is placed much
before.
∎ Definition 21 (Inactivation Gadget). We add to our fixed arena A special moves 7 and 6
which, for simplicity, are justified by any other move of opposite polarity and λ(7) = P and
λ(6) = O. We denote with A+ the enlarged arena. Given a play s = ●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●k ○k ●k+1,
we define
s▽ = ●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●k ○k 6 7 ●k+1
which is always assumed to be a play such that: the moves ●i and ○i for 0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1 point
to the same moves they point to in s; the first occurrence of 6 points to ○0; for every edge
(●i,○j) in s, with j > 0, the occurrence of the move 6 immediately following ○j , points to the
occurrence of the move 7 immediately preceding ●i; each occurrence of the move 7 points
to the immediately preceding move 6. In a picture, when j > 0
7 ●i . . . ○j 6
We shall denote with 7(i) and 6(i) respectively the i-th occurrence of 7 and the i-th
occurrence of 6 in s▽.
We now characterize the views of s▽ and prove that s▽ is a visible play over A+ whenever
s is a visible play over A. In particular we show that the operation of O-view commutes
with ▽, which means: ⌞s▽⌟ = ⌞s⌟
▽
. Moreover, the operation of P -view eliminates all the
gadgets: ⌜s▽⌝ = ⌜s⌝.
∎ Proposition 22 (Views and Visibility of s▽). Let s = ●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●k ○k ●k+1 be a visible
play over A.
1. Assume 0 ≤ j ≤ k and there are indexes i1, j1, . . . , im, jm such that
⌞●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●j ○j⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 . . . ●im ○jm
Then
⌞(●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●j ○j)⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 6 7 ●i2 ○j2 6 7 . . . ●im ○jm
⌞(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j 67 ●j+1)⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 6 7 . . . ●im ○jm 67 ●j+1
⌜(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j 67 ●j+1)⌝ = ⌜●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●j ○j ●j+1⌝
⌜(●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●j ○j6)⌝ = 7
(i1)
6
(j1) . . . 7(im) 6(jm)
2. s▽ is a visible play over A+.
Proof.
1. By induction on j. Let
r = ●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●j ○j
and let ↖ ○j = (●i,○j). Then
r = ●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●i−1 ○i−1 67 ●i . . . ○j
By definition of O-view
⌞r⌟ = ⌞(●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●i−1 ○i−1)⌟67 ●i ○j
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Letting
⌞●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●i−1 ○i−1⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 . . . ●jn ○jn
we have by definition of O-view and induction hypothesis
⌞●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●j ○j⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 . . . ●jn ○jn ●i ○j
⌞r⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 6 7 . . . ●in ○jn 67 ●i ○j
which establishes the first equation of the thesis. The second one is established by
⌞(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j 67●j+1)⌟
=⌞(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j)⌟67 ●j+1
= ●i1 ○j1 6 7 . . . ●im ○jm 67 ●j+1
We now prove the third equation. Assume ↖ ●j+1 = (○i,●j+1). Then by induction hypo-
thesis
⌜(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j 67 ●j+1)⌝
=⌜(●0 ○0 6 7 . . .7 6 ●i)⌝ ○i ●j+1
=⌜(●0 ○0 . . . ●i)⌝ ○i ●j+1
=⌜(●0 ○0 . . . ●j ○j ●j+1)⌝
Finally, let us prove the fourth equation. Let
r = ●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●j ○j6
and let ↖ ○j = (●i,○j). Then
r = ●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●i−1 ○i−1 67
(i) ●i . . . ○j 6
(j)
and there is an edge (7(i),6(j)) in r. By definition of P -view
⌜r⌝ = ⌜(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●i−1 ○i−1 6)⌝7
(i)
6
(j)
Letting
⌞●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●i−1 ○i−1⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 . . . ●jn ○jn
we have by definition of O-view and induction hypothesis
⌞●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●j ○j⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 . . . ●jn ○jn ●i ○j
⌜r⌝ = 7(i1) 6(j1) . . . 7(in) 6(jn) 7(i) 6(j)
which is the thesis.
2. By Definition 21
s▽ = ●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●k ○k 6 7 ●k+1
Let r a be any initial segment of s▽, with r non empty. We must show that a points to
a move in ⌜r⌝ if λ(a) = P , and that a points to a move in ⌞r⌟ if λ(a) = O. The thesis is
trivial when a points to the immediately previous move, thus when a = 7 or a = 6(0).
We have other three cases, according to the remaning possible shapes of a.
If a = 6(j), with j > 0, then λ(a) = O and by Definition 21
r = . . .7(i) ●i . . . ○j
and the edges (●i,○j) and (7
(i),6(j)) are in s▽. Since ⌞r⌟ = . . .7(i) ●i ○j, we are
done.
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If a = ○0, then λ(a) = P , thus ⌜r⌝ = ●0 and we are done. If a = ○j+1, then λ(a) = P and
by the third equation of point 1., we have
⌜r⌝ = ⌜(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j 67 ●j+1)⌝ = ⌜●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●j ○j ●j+1⌝
Since s is visible, ○j+1 points in s – and thus in s
▽ – to some ●i in ⌜r⌝, with 0 ≤ i ≤ j+1,
and we are done.
If a = ●j+1, then λ(a) = O and as a consequence of the first equation of point 1., we
have
⌞r⌟ = ⌞(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j 67)⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 6 7 . . . ●jm ○jm 67
with
⌞●0 ○0 . . . ●j ○j⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 . . . ●jm ○jm
Since s is visible, ●j+1 points in s – and thus in s
▽ – to some ○jn , with 1 ≤ n ≤m, and
we are done.
◂
Thanks to the results of Section §5, we know that in order to compute the backtracking
level of a visible play, it is sufficient to compute the backtracking level of its views. Thus we
start by proving that for every O-view s, the transformation mapping s into s▽ effectively
lowers the backtracking level of O to d − 2, assuming the arena is of depth d ≥ 2.
∎ Lemma 23. Let s = ●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●k ○k ●k+1 be a visible play over the arena A and d ≥ 2
the depth of A. Assume that for all i, the edge (●i,○i) is in s. Then the backtracking level
of O in s▽ is less than or equal to d − 2.
Proof. By Definition 21
s▽ = ●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●k ○k 6 7 ●k+1
We first prove that if 0 < i < k+1, then ↖ ●j is inactive for every j ≥ i in the following initial
segment of s▽:
r = ●0 ○0 6 . . .7 ●i ○i 6 . . .7 ●j ○j 6 7
We argue by induction on j − i. By Definition 21, for i ≤ l ≤ j, the sequence 7 ●l ○l 6, with
justification pointers, must have the following shape:
7 ●l ○l 6
In particular the sequence 7 ●j ○j 6 has the following shape:
7 ●j ○j 6
Since the above j-th occurrence of ↖ 6 is active in r, we infer that ↖ ●j is inactive in r.
Moreover, for every l such that i < l < j, by induction hypothesis ↖ ●l is inactive in r. Now
consider the sequence 7 ●i ○i 6:
7 ●i ○i 6
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Since every edge e of r such that ↖ 6↶e must be of the form e =↖ ●l, with i < l ≤ j and e
is inactive in r, we conclude that ↖ 6 is active in r, and finally that ↖ ●i is inactive in r.
From what we have just proved we conclude that for no i, j it is the case that ↖ ●i◁↖ ●j
in s▽. Hence, every maximal inactivation chain c in s▽ that determines the backtracking
level of O is contained in a chain having one of the two following shapes:
↖ ●i1 ◁↖ 6
(i1)◁↖ ●i2 ◁↖ 6
(i2)◁ . . . ◁↖ ●im ◁↖ 6
(im)
↖ 6
(i1)◁↖ ●i2 ◁↖ 6
(i2)◁ . . . ◁↖ ●im ◁↖ 6
(im)
In the first case, there is a play
●i1 ← ○i1 ← ●i2 ← ○i2 ← . . . ← ●im ← ○im
Since ●i1 points backward, it cannot be the first move and thus points to a Player move,
which in turn must point to an Opponent move; therefore, ●i1 must be the last move of a
simple play over A of at least 3 moves. Since the arena depth is d, we conclude 2m ≤ d − 2,
which is the thesis. In the second case, there is a play
○i1 ← ●i2 ← ○i2 ← . . . ← ●im ← ○im
Now, i1 = 0 is impossible, for 6
(0) points to the immediately preceding move ○0 and it cannot
be inactivated by any edge. Therefore, ○i1 points to the immediately preceding Opponent
move, which points to a Player move pointing to yet another Opponent move; this means
that ○i1 must be the last move of a simple play over A of at least 4 moves. We conclude
2m − 1 ≤ d − 2, which is the thesis. ◂
We are now in a position to prove that for any visible play s over A, the backtracking level
of O in s▽ is less than or equal to the depth d of the arena minus 2.
∎ Theorem 24 (Backtracking Level Normalization). Let s = ●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●k ○k ●k+1 be a
visible play over the arena A and d ≥ 2 the depth of A. Then the backtracking level of O in
s▽ is less than or equal to d − 2.
Proof. By Definition 21
s▽ = ●0 ○0 6 7 ●1 ○1 6 7 . . . ●k ○k 6 7 ●k+1
By Proposition 22, the O-views of the initial segments of s▽ that we have to consider are of
the form
⌞(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j 67 ●j+1)⌟
= ●i1 ○j1 6 7 . . . ●im ○jm 67●j+1
and
⌞(●0 ○0 6 7 . . . ●j ○j 6)⌟
= ●i1 ○j1 6 7 . . . ●im ○jm 6
with
⌞●0 ○0 ●1 ○1 . . . ●j ○j⌟ = ●i1 ○j1 . . . ●jm ○jm
and thus, for 1 ≤ n ≤m, the edges (●jn ,○jn) are in s and so in s
▽. By Proposition 10, every
inactivation chain in s▽ ending with an O-edge is already contained in the O-view of the
initial segment of s▽ ending with that edge. Moreover, by Lemma 23, every O-view of any
initial segment of s▽ terminating with ●j+1 or 6 is of backtracking level less than or equal
to d−2. We conclude that the backtracking level of O in s▽ is less than or equal to d−2. ◂
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We conclude by proving a strengthened version of Theorem 20, which guarantees that the
tower of exponentials defining the complexity of strategy interactions is never higher than
the arena depth minus 2.
∎Theorem 25 (Refined-Min-Backtracking-Theorem). Let σ be a Player n-backtracking strategy
bounded by k, τ an Opponent m-backtracking strategy bounded by k, d ≥ 2 the depth of the
arena A and b = min(n,m,d − 2). Assume s ∈ σ ⋆ τ and s = s0 s1 . . . sl. Then
l ≤ (2k)(2k)
.
.
(2k)2k
´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
b+1
≤ 22
.
.
22k(log 2k)⋅2
´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
b+1
= 2
2k(log 2k)⋅2
b
Proof. By Theorem 12, s is visible and of real backtracking level b. If n < d− 2 or m < d− 2,
the thesis follows by Theorem 20. Otherwise, by Theorem 24, O is of backtracking level no
greater than d − 2 in s▽. By Definition 3 of σ ⋆ τ , every initial segment s′ of s is in σ or τ
and since both strategies are bounded by k, ⌜s′⌝ ≤ k and ⌞s′⌟ ≤ k. From the characterization
of views of Proposition 22, it easily follows that for every initial segment s′ of s▽, it holds
⌜s′⌝ ≤ 2k and ⌞s′⌟ ≤ 2k. By Theorem 19 applied to s▽, and since s is shorter than s▽, we
obtain the thesis. ◂
Concluding remarks. Theorem 25 can also be derived in another way. When the
minimum among the backtracking levels of the strategies is smaller than the depth of the
arena minus 2, one uses Theorem 19. When it is not the case, one can use Coquand’s
Trimming technique; with little adjustments, our main calculations would work just fine
and one would obtain the correct upper bounds. The techniques of this section, however,
are sharper: they open the possibility of optimizing strategies. For example, if just a proper
initial segment of a strategy has excessive backtracking level, using our techniques one may
very well take the overall backtracking level even below the arena depth, thus obtaining
better bounds.
Our bounds, moreover, are sharp. This easily follows from Clairambault’s lower bounds
[13] or any others. Indeed, whenever a strategy debate takes as many steps as computed by
a tower of exponentials having height d − 2, we know that the minimum among the back-
tracking levels of the players must be at least d − 2, so it can be taken to be exactly d − 2.
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